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The ARMY HISTORIAN

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The Center and Historical Analysis

Secretary Marsh, in his letter of instruction of March 1, 1983, directed that the Center of Military History give increased priority to the preparation of historical studies in support of Army staff planning and mission execution. Actually, the Center has long assisted the Army in applying history to staff planning. It has done so by creating, through research, writing, reference service, and archival activities, a historical data base upon which other Army agencies could draw for their own work. The Center has also contributed through its support of military history education, preparing prospective Army leaders to use historical information and modes of thinking as they confront the problems of command.

Now, however, the Center is required to go beyond the general, more or less traditional, services it has formerly provided. The new goal for the Center is to devote more of its efforts specifically to the preparation of historical studies focused directly upon current Army activities, problems, and policy issues.

Historical studies and analyses can be primarily narrative accounts of recent Army operations; they can present the historical background of a particular policy or organizational issue in its development over time and in the context of other events; and they can review past efforts to deal with recurrent problems. To qualify as analyses, however, the studies must go beyond a chronological recital of facts to draw conclusions from the information, on the factors, for example, motivating a particular decision, or the reasons for the outcome of a policy. Conclusions of this type may result from the deliberate testing of hypotheses against evidence uncovered in research, or they may emerge in the course of preparing a straightforward historical narrative.

As defense issues become ever more complex and take a central place in national policy debates, national security studies are once again an expanding field within the government and, after a Vietnam-related hiatus, in the academic community. Many Army agencies are involved in one way or another in studies and analyses. Several of these, including the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College and the Combined Arms Combat Development Center at Fort Leavenworth, have been identified as regularly doing studies that draw extensively on historical information or approach problems from a historical point of view. This expanding use of historical data within the Army parallels a broader trend throughout our society. An increasing number of governmental and private institutions are finding historical information and historical methods of analysis useful in a variety of practical ways. The challenge for the Center of Military History is to bring its skills to bear more effectively and responsively on current and future Army concerns.

For the present, owing to a gap between objectives and resources made available, the Center must perform this task by regrouping its existing personnel resources. To this end, the Center has formed a new Research and Analysis Division consisting of three branches. Two of these, the Refer-

Home of the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

ence and Staff Support Branches, are transfers from other divisions. The Analysis Branch is a new creation. The Center is staffing this latter branch, the heart of its analysis effort, in part by moving personnel spaces into it as they become vacant, and in part by temporarily detailing historians to it from other subdivisions for particular short-term projects appropriate to their special skills. This method has been employed to staff the current Grenada study and several other on-going projects. While getting the maximum results from the resources currently available, the Center hopes not to be living with such stopgap measures two or three years from now. We envisage providing the Army in historical analysis what the Congressional Budget Office provides Congress in fiscal and budgetary analysis: systematically prepared, timely and informative analytical studies meeting current and future planning needs. As the Congressional Budget Office's studies do not preempt the decisions of Congress and its committees, so the Center's studies will not attempt to preempt the Army staff planners. The Center will not recommend decisions, but through objective explications and analyses of what has happened before can point out the strengths and weaknesses of alternative policies of the past.

In a major departure from previous practice, the Center will be initiating studies on its own, examining issues, for example, posed in the five-year Army budget projections or otherwise identified as of potential future importance to the Army. The studies are intended to result in historical monographs suitable for eventual publication and, in some cases, wide distribution.

We move into this new field of endeavor aware of both potential pitfalls and opportunities. Analysts involved in the policy process (even historical) must, as must other professionals, maintain their commitment to sound methodology and independent judgment on the basis of evidence in the face of those seeking support for their positions in complex policy debates. The record of history is filled with instances of the misuse of historical evidence and analogy, often with disastrous consequences. History is not a source of fixed lessons carved in stone that can be applied mechanically to current situations. Instead, we continually learn new things from history as we ask different questions of history, and sometimes the lessons are neither expected nor welcome. It will be the task of Center historians to do what they can to provide the Army with sound, relevant historical analyses for its policy-making processes. We welcome the challenge.

Editor's Journal

As we come out with our third quarterly issue, *The Army Historian* has found its place in the literature. Comment from the Army's senior leadership has been encouraging, subscription requests have come in by the hundreds, requests for back issues keep coming in, and many approving letters have arrived. We are grateful, and are trying to continue a quality, useful product. This issue includes articles on the use of military history in the field, and major pieces on the state of the art and on strategic thought and readings. The distribution list has been put into shape, and we are trying to keep track of our military subscribers' changes of duty station.

All those laudatory letters we received present us with a problem, however. We had hoped to be running a commentary and exchange section by now to feature our readers' responses. But we don't want to put together a series of "really enjoyed your publication," "doing a wonderful job" letters. You've seen this sort of letters-to-the-editor column often enough. Don't get us wrong. We love getting those accolades; we just need something a bit more substantial for an exchange column. Liking is not necessarily agreeing. We actually hope not everyone will agree with all that is

See **Journal**, p. 6

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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CHIEF'S BULLETIN

Douglas Kinnard

Army Historian Series

The Director's Advisory Board for The Army Historian series held its first meeting in February. Readers will recall that the series encompasses a revision of the ROTC military history test, the publication of other works, such as one being done at the U.S. Military Academy on the relationship between geography and military history, the publication of deserving manuscripts forwarded from the field, the reprinting of military classics, and a speakers series featuring well-known academics from other countries. The board members were in general agreement on a variety of issues. The new version of the Army ROTC text, *American Military History*, will be half as long as the earlier edition and have double the illustrations, with a lively and readable text. Pedagogical experts, veteran undergraduate teachers, will be brought into the process on an advisory basis. What is needed is something that will put the student in the boots of the historical soldier. Like other Center publications, a good ROTC text must be impartial and incorporate the latest historical criticism, favorable or otherwise. Reprinting out-of-print military classics will present particular challenges and opportunities. Involved are copyright laws, what types of books to be reprinted, and liaisons with bookstores and distributors. The board suggested a number of likely titles.

Special Studies

In addition to our main line publications, we are engaged in a number of special studies. The Center has undertaken, for example, a study of the use to which military history has been put in the education of Army officers. Another major study, this under way in the still-forming Analysis Branch of the Research and Analysis Division, will explore issues connected with researching Vietnam history. Designed for publication and scholarly use, it will be bibliographical to a degree, and will examine source collections, their locations, breadths, and conditions placed on their use. There will also be a section on the special problems of research on Vietnam.

Our attitude on the availability and use of source material is in line with a directive to the directors and chiefs of Army staff and special staff divisions, that there be "no reservations as to whether or not the evidence of history places the Army in a favorable light." The directive is dated November 20, 1947, and is signed Dwight D. Eisenhower. Its admonition still governs our approach to research, writing, and publication in general.

As we initiate analytical studies similar to those I have mentioned, we are looking ahead at a number of historical subject possibilities, such as the Army contribution to joint doctrine since Vietnam. My participation in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans' periodic directors' meetings gives me a firsthand view of the types of studies the Army will be needing to deal with a variety of issues in the years ahead.

National Museum

While we have awaited the passage of the Joint Resolution of Congress on the establishment of the National Museum of the U.S. Army, now caught up in the normal legislative rush, there have not been major activities on the museum in recent months. Once the resolution is passed (and no problems are expected in its passage), General E.C. Meyer, President of the Board of Directors of the Army Historical Foundation, will be naming people to serve on his board and beginning his campaign for corporate financial support. Included on the Board of Directors will be a key position of executive vice president, a part- or full-time employee of the Foundation. The architects for this stage of the planning, in coordination with the Corps of Engineers, are nearing completion of their site study. The primary site remains one adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery. I am now in the process of establishing a GS-15 position to head the Center's National Museum activities. The person occupying this position will not be part of any Center division or branch, and will in all probability report directly to me.

Research Associates

We are also establishing a Research Associates program at the Center, providing an opportunity for military and civilian scholars on sabbaticals or foundation grants to work at the Center for a year. The subjects of research undertaken and subsequent publication must have a bearing on the field of military history. Although we cannot provide typing assistance, we can provide a typewriter, together with most other forms of support. Prospective candidates for the Research Associates program may express their interest by writing to me here at the Center.

Answers About Additional Skill Indicator 5X

Donald P. Shaw

Additional skill indicator 5X is a device the Army uses to denote an officer's having achieved a certain level of expertise in the field of history. There has been considerable concern among those assigned the indicator about how it is used, and considerable confusion among commanders and staffs about how to request the services of those who hold it. In conversations with knowledgeable representatives of the Combat Studies Institute, the U.S. Army War College, the Center of Military History, the U.S. Military Academy's Department of History, and the Army's Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), I sought hard, nuts-and-bolts answers to the most frequently asked questions on 5X. The answers generally arrived at follow:

1. What does additional skill indicator 5X represent?

Although there are several ways in which the 5X may be awarded, the commonest is for the officer to have received a graduate degree, M.A. or Ph.D., in history. Most of the Army's graduate degree holders in history have received them in preparation for teaching assignments in the Department of History at West Point, although there are a number of 5X's which have been awarded as result of individual education and study not sponsored by the Army, and service experience.

2. What is the Army's current 5X inventory?

COL	79
LTC	237
MAJ	191
CPT	151
LT	17
Total	675

Before November 1983, there were only about 179 designated 5X's. A MILPERCEN records check, however, indicated that a much larger number were actually eligible for the award of the additional skill indicator. The award actions were made by letter late in 1983 and resulted in the current asset level.

3. What are the Army's needs and space authorizations for the 5X?

	Required	Authorized
COL	12	13
LTC	23	18
MAJ	33	24
CPT	42	39
LT	0	0
Totals	110	94

The History Department at West Point and the Training and Doctrine Command control about ninety percent of the assigned 5X's.

4. How is the 5X used in assignments?

5X is a skill indicator, not an assignment dictator. The primary assignment devices remain the specialty code and the secondary specialty identifier. From here the path branches. When a position calling for the 5X additional skill indicator has been authorized on an organization's manpower document and, most important, has been validated by the Army Education Requirements Board as requiring graduate education, the Army's personnel system and the 5X manager are obligated to produce the asset required. If a commander or manager wants and needs a uniformed historian, but the space into which he wants to put that person has not been validated by the Army Education Requirements Board, he can request the graduate historian but the system is not obligated to respond with a graduate-educated officer. Further, the commander must use the 5X in the "trailer" part of the personnel request; it cannot be indicated in the primary part of the request document. Board validation is crucial here. However much a commander may want and need a qualified uniformed historian, if he does not have a validated position, he will not get a 5X.

The use of the specialty code and secondary specialty identifier as the primary assignment devices may be changing. A study group is looking into whether or not the 5X should predominate in branch immaterial assignments, particularly at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels. If this change is implemented, a commander would be able to

ask for a lieutenant colonel or colonel and have the 5X additional skill indicator predominate over the primary and secondary specialty indicators. Such a change would, of course, simplify getting an officer with the desired historical skills at the appropriate grade.

5. Are officers who serve repetitive 5X tours hurt before selection boards?

Officers who serve in 5X and remain qualified in their specialties do well. Officers who serve in repetitive 5X assignments instead of serving with troops or in other key specialty-oriented assignments do not do so well. This is true in other types of special assignments and is not unique to 5X. The message here is to maintain a strong specialty qualification status as you serve 5X tours.

6. Whom should officers contact with questions on 5X?

The point of contact for 5X is Capt. Rick Jackson in MILPERCEN, who can be reached at AUTOVON 221-8152 or 8153. He is very knowledgeable on the additional skill indicator and will be most helpful.

There is general agreement by both producers and users of 5X's that the system works. Some fine tuning is being considered, but commanders who understand the requirement to validate a uniformed historian position can use the current system to get the assets they need. Holders of the 5X, once they understand how the system works and the importance of maintaining their specialty qualifications, will find that this additional skill identifier can lead to rewarding assignments and broadened careers.

Colonel Shaw is director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

The Integrated Military History Program at the U.S. Army War College

Thomas F. Healy

When the Army's Ad Hoc Committee on the Study of Military History looked at the U.S. Army War College in 1971, the College was using such a "soft sell" approach to the study of military history that the subject could not be identified among the many topics being offered. Historical examples and case studies were scattered throughout the curriculum, but there was no systematic historical program. Carlisle Barracks had tremendous historical assets, with the professional staff and vast collection of the Military History Institute, its oral history program, and, beginning in 1972, its visiting professor of military history. Faculty experts in military history added elective courses in the early 1970s and made extensive use of history in the Evolution of Military Strategy segment of the core curriculum. That core curriculum, however, centered on current Army problems and the current international scene and seemed to offer little opportunity for military history instruction.

The situation changed in 1982 with the creation of a successful pilot program that convinced curriculum planners that military history instruction, planned and taught by professional historians, could effectively tie together many of the practical and theoretical subjects taught at the War College. This year's War College students benefit from the resulting integrated program in military history.

To establish the new program, the War College created two new faculty positions. Professor Jay Luvaas became the new professor of military history. His Army colleague is Colonel Harold Nelson, who has taught history at the U.S. Military Academy and the Command and General Staff College. These two new faculty members work with the officers who develop the curriculum to determine areas in which history is needed. They then develop historical materials which fill these needs and result in a rational development of key historical topics. Lecturers and seminar instructors are drawn from throughout the Carlisle Barracks community. The Military History Institute is an important source, but the academic departments, Strategic Studies Institute, Center for Land Warfare, and the student body all make contributions. Classroom instruction is supplemented by a wide variety of voluntary activities.

The academic year's classroom "course" centers on the U.S. experience since 1861, with an excursion into broader fields to support the students' reading of Clausewitz's *On War*. Major

topics include the human dimension of combat, the history of U.S. strategy, problems of coalition warfare, civil-military relations, the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and case studies in World War II operations and campaign planning. In all, students receive about forty hours of military history in the core curriculum, with the bulk concentrated in the early phases of the course so that they will have the necessary tools and background for later instruction.

Many students supplement this instruction with elective courses in the spring. The single course offered in 1972 has grown to nearly a dozen, so that today's student is virtually assured of finding a course that fits his needs. All of these courses are modeled on graduate school courses, with weekly three-hour seminar meetings throughout the ten-week span of the course and heavy emphasis on student research, writing, and interaction. Other students volunteer for military study projects in history. Most of these resemble research tutorials, putting the student in close contact with a faculty member with special expertise and drawing on the unique historical collection at the Military History Institute. Other study projects include oral history debriefings of senior officers, sponsored jointly by the War College and the Military History Institute.

The most popular voluntary activities use battlefields as classrooms. When the Army War College moved to Carlisle Barracks from Leavenworth in 1951, the new Commandant immediately reinstituted the Gettysburg trip that had been a highlight of the pre-World War II curriculum. The Gettysburg briefing and tour is still a popular autumn event, and it has now been supplemented by more demanding staff rides to Antietam, Chancellorsville, South Mountain, and other Civil War battlefields. This program, in conjunction with the classroom instruction, has been remarkably successful because it puts officers in touch with their professional roots and gives them a more profound understanding of their service traditions.

While we take great pride in the integrated military history program at the U.S. Army War College, we know there is room for improvement. There are gaps in the curriculum that we have not yet filled, and we continuously face competing demands for time. Most of the improvements in our program will be in the voluntary activities, because our students, with their differing backgrounds and needs, are attracted to well-designed courses, staff rides, lecture programs, and individual study opportunities. We are fortunate to be able to contemplate improved response to their needs within budgetary constraints because our staff and the rich resources of the Military History Institute allow us to perfect the program without establishing a specialized department or hiring additional faculty.

Of course, in designing this program and contemplating future improvements we are motivated by the desire to improve the entire learning experience, not just the study of history. Whether we consider instruction in leadership, strategy, operational planning, defense policy fomulation, or any of the myriad subjects taught at the War College, we are confident that the integrated study of military history under a single curriculum management is resulting in the desired improvements.

Major General Healy is Commandant of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Journal, From p. 2

said in this publication, and that some will let us know their considered reasons. Similarly, we hope we'll be hearing something on our readers' experience applying some of the military history techniques and ideas our articles express. Perhaps the inclusion in our last issue of a single-purpose subscription form inhibited in-depth comment. We welcome thoughtful observations and hope for some pleasantly disputatious response.

We have considered going beyond our sixteen-page format, something we could have done with this issue, but have decided to maintain our present page length while we husband our resources for future issues. A new periodical should get to the point where it is two issues ahead of itself in preparation before it attempts sustained expansion. We have had many expressions of interest in publishing articles in *The Army Historian*, and response to our invitation to authors has been good. We remind would-be contributors that we are looking to publish articles *on* military history, its writing, teaching, and application, and not necessarily military historical pieces on battles and the like.

Imitation may be the highest form of praise, but for a publication such as our's it's reprints of our work. Last issue's piece on logistical readings has been or will be reprinted in at least four major journals we know of, and we encourage the publication of our articles elsewhere. An interested editor need only notify us of an intention to reprint, and run the article with byline and attribution to *The Army Historian*.

PERSPECTIVE

Three Faces of Military History

Raymond Callahan

The Army Historian continues here its series of guest contributions on the state of military history. Dr. Callahan served as John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College during the 1982–83 academic year, and is a member of the Department of History, University of Delaware.

Our past as a profession has cut grooves along which we and our successors will continue to travel. The first thing that strikes anyone looking at the history of military history is that it is one of the oldest forms of historical writing. The historians of classical antiquity wrote mostly about war, as did the chroniclers and annalists of the medieval world. The same might be said of classical and medieval literature generally. In the modern era the impact of the Enlightenment and the growing dominance of the idea of progress had an interesting effect upon this long tradition of writing military history for general consumption. Military history broke into three components during the nineteenth century, and those three separate parts continue their isolated, very often mutually suspicious, existences today. They are the popular, the academic, and the official faces of military history.

The Popular Face

As we all know, not least because John Keegan has remainded us in the opening chapter of his magnificant work, *The Face of Battle*, one of the best-selling historical studies of the nineteenth century was Edward Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, published in 1859. Creasy's purpose was of course not merely to entertain, but to instruct. (He was, after all, a Victorian.) From Creasy's day to the present, the stream of popular history in the English-speaking world has flowed strong if not always clear. Much of it, of course, carries no didactic baggage but is simply meant to inform, entertain, and earn the author, his agents and publishers a more or less honest dollar or pound. But it is foolish to dismiss, as many academic historians are all too prone to do, this entire genre or writing with a contemptuous curl of the lip. Creasy was not the less influential for being thoroughly amateur (and often completely wrong).

In our own time the work of the Australian journalist Chester Wilmot, whose *Struggle for Europe* appeared over thirty years ago, has played a role in shaping our views of Anglo-American strategy arguably second only to that of Churchill himself. Churchill, of course, also falls into the category of influential popular historians. His impact on popular perceptions of the period from 1933 to 1945 would require an entire seminar to itself. The reason both Wilmot and Churchill were so influential was of course that, because they published early, they provided the raw material for a generation of textbooks and lectures, neither ever revised as frequently as they ought to be. We have only to look at today's best seller lists, book club selections, or the racks of paperbacks arrayed in supermarkets and drugstores to find confirmation of the durable appeal of popular military history, ranging all the way from very good work, like Keegan's *Six Armies in Normandy*, to the dreadful paperback quickies whose authors substitute a fertility of invention for fidelity to fact.

Popular military history has lately expanded into a new dimension, as television "dramatically recreates" (and in the process hopelessly warps) everything from the Civil War through World War II. This is not to say that popular treatments cannot be good; Keegan is proof of that. Nor is it to say that film cannot assist the understanding of war in eras past, as witness the BBC film "Culloden," or Ophuls' powerful "The Sorrow and the Pity." All too often, however, this type of military history is merely entertainment, at best. Some of this is of course the fault of the professional historians, of us. Trained in graduate schools whose faculties often take as little interest in the quality of their students' writing as they do in the not insignificant question of how history can best be taught, we leave the field open to those who would meet the demand. The demand is certainly there. One of the curious facts of this pacific age is its appetite for war stories. Popular military history will be with us for a long time, pillaging (or ignoring) the work of academic and official historians alike. I would like to think of it as a challenge to us, a challenge to write good, clear,

accurate narrative prose for those, and there are a lot of them, who want to read it.

The Academic Face

About the time that Creasy was writing his book, the process was beginning that, for better or worse, produced today's historical profession. Germanic in origin (like official history, the general staff system, and a number of other aspects of our subject), it was well-established in the English-speaking world by the end of the nineteenth century. But something curious happened to the historical profession on its way across the English channel; the study of war and military institutions dropped overboard. There was no British (or American) Delbrück. The prevailing liberal (in the Victorian sense) biases of the late nineteenth century largely account for this. War, at least major war between industrialized nations, was, so everyone thought, increasingly unlikely and, as a subject for study, distasteful. The history of war and military institutions could therefore be left to journalists and retired colonels, an attitude which, somewhat attenuated, still survived when I entered graduate school twenty years ago. After all, a great deal of historical research is sparked by contemporary concerns, as the explosion of work on women's history over the last fifteen years illustrates. If prior to 1914 war was thought a fading relic of a past left behind (except in benighted corners of the world) by a march of progress, after 1918 it was all too recent and painful a memory. I think it is no coincidence that some of the most innovative work done by British historians in the interwar years dealt with the eighteenth century. Yet during the interwar years a few historians, like Marc Bloch, began to direct attention to how very fundamental were the ways in which war and military institutions affected the development of society.

The wholesale involvement of a generation of historians in the war effort in Britain and the United States between 1939 and 1945 furthered the process of treating military history as one historical specialty among many, rather than as something not quite respectable. But the fortunes of academic military history since World War II have taken some interesting turns. For one thing, its practitioners have often been interested in it as something that affected social, economic or intellectual history, rather than as a subject of study in its own right. To some extent this approach, the "War and Society" approach, has been the price of academic respectability, a way in which academic military historians differentiate what they do from "drum and trumpet" or "bugles and bayonets" history—these being, of course, the territory of those dreaded quasi-mythic figures, the retired colonels. One of the first landmark books to take the war-and-society approach was John U. Nef's *War and Human Progress*, which examined the economic impact of war and found it negative. William McNeill's immensely stimulating new book, *The Pursuit of Power*, is in direct line of descent from Nef's, even though McNeill draws some very different conclusions. Other examples of this approach, both very warmly received by reviewers, are Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* and Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory*.

This approach to integrating the study of war into the historical mainstream has not been without success. The extent to which the nineteenth-century assumption that such history is not real history survives, however, can only be appreciated by someone who has sat on faculty curriculum review committees, or perhaps by anyone who has noted the attitude of the American Historical Association and the editorial policies of its house organ, *The American Historical Review*. The relative success of some academic treatments of military history carries with it some real problems. Because many academic historians of war and military institutions are concentrating on the links between these areas and other, presumably larger and more significant questions, they often do not interest themselves in the details of how things work, of what actually happened. Reviewing McNeill's *Pursuit of Power* in *The New York Review of Books*, John Keegan made precisely this point. Not long ago I heard one of my colleagues at Fort Leavenworth, where I was a visiting professor at the Combat Studies Institute, remark that a certain work "wasn't tactical enough," and my mind flashed back to a conversation about a manuscript submitted for university press publication of which one of my university associates said, "It's nothing but tactics." But no academic historians, at least none I know, argue that knowledge of the nuts and bolts of politics somehow makes a political historian less credible. Here is one area where academic military historians can learn a great deal from the official military historical community.

Whatever its current problems and shortcomings, however, university-based military history has, I believe, a reasonably bright future. For one thing, this generation of students seems to have a strong interest in the subject. Why this should be the case is worth considering for a moment. Some students, of course, like the technology of war or the minutiae of uniforms, but I believe that the

basic reason is precisely their lack of personal contact with something that they perceive will, in various ways, bulk large in their lives. Be this as it may, the fact of student interest means that there is always a good enrollment for a well-conducted course. Given the pressures to which liberal arts departments are subject these days, chairmen and deans look with rejoicing upon a course that can pull in a hundred or more students.

There are also larger reasons than mere departmental survival for the growing acceptance of military history, and these reasons allow me to end my remarks on the academic face of military history on a moderately cheerful note. There is a growing recognition of the fact that the liberal arts departments of colleges and universities face a great challenge and opportunity in contributing to the general education of our undergraduates. The number of students majoring in history is less significant than the number we can attract or persuade to take a package of interrelated courses that give them a sense of the past and traditions of our civilization, as well as a grasp of how societies and institutions change over time. Conflict, the preparation for it, and the resolution or avoidance of it is part of that story, and will be far into the future. Furthermore, the Army's decision to encourage the fulfillment of ROTC military history objectives whenever possible through history department courses has given university-based historians the chance to play an important role in the basic education of approximately eighty-five percent of each year's induction of new second lieutenants. If we in university departments can equip future citizens and officers with more accurate and sophisticated perceptions of the impact of war and military institutions upon our past, we will have not only done well professionally but will have in the process made a significant contribution to the maintenance of an educated citizenry, a democratic society's *sine qua non*.

The Official Face

If I have saved until last the third, or official, face of military history, it is not because I value it less but because I feel a greater diffidence about discussing it. Popular history I know because I either use it or try to combat its influence on students, and my professional home is in the academic historical community. But the world of official history is one that, until recently, I viewed from the outside.

Officially sponsored historical study of war and military institutions has had, in one sense, a more straightforward career than its academic cousin. Born to serve a highly specific need, it has continued to do so in both this country and the rest of the English-speaking world. Its boundaries, however, have slowly widened until it has come to supply a great deal more than tactical and operational detail. The official histories of the 1914–18 war offered almost nothing on strategy. Those covering 1939–45, in both Britain and the United States, not only covered strategy but logistics, military government, and much more besides. The Center of Military History's projected series of volumes on Vietnam will include one on the role and impact of the press, the necessity for which tells us an enormous amount about the changing nature of war in a democratic society. Taken together, the output of the Center, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Army War College, as well as their equivalents in the other services, represents an exercise in the study and writing of military history unique in scope and volume of publication.

The value of official history to the services is, I think, obvious—not only a tactical, operational, and logistical record, but an institutional memory as well, perhaps fulfilling the role of the slave who rode in triumphal march in the chariot behind the Roman general, whispering a reminder of frailty and mortality. Its value to the larger historical community is equally great. The U.S. Army in World War II series of volumes, the green books, became basic references and points of departure for future historians. As the late Arthur Marder demonstrated so effectively in his magisterial series on the Royal Navy in World War I, official histories cannot be the final word on their subject. No history of great events can ever be final simply because each generation brings new perspectives to its contemplation of the past. But official historians lay the foundation for what will follow. Their access to documents, research and writing time untrammeled by faculty committees and clamorous undergraduates, as well as their freedom from publishers' pressures to make the Christmas book market, all combine to put them in a position no academic historian can ever hope to have (and no writer of pop history could endure). For all these reasons I personally hope that the Center's volumes on Vietnam reach the public in time to prevent the legend, myth, and half-truths swirling about that subject from hardening into orthodoxy enshrined forever in textbooks, all too often monuments of inaccuracy cleverly disguised as revealed Truth.

The unique position of official historians brings its problems. Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds, the principal author of the British World War I Western Front volumes, gradually found himself drawn into the position of defending

Douglas Haig against what Lloyd George and Churchill were saying in their memoirs. Being inside the machine brings the danger of becoming an advocate for this or that past policy or personality, or alternatively finding oneself in a position where one is told "here is current doctrine, validate it historically," a dangerous situation for historian and institution alike. And this brings me to a point that is not only a present concern but, in my view at least, of great significance for the future.

Just as many of his university brethren have doubts about the academic military historian, the academic military historian in turn is all too often sceptical about the viability of linking the adjective "official" with the noun "history." To this some official historians will occasionally retort in words that might be summarized thus: "If you knew what we know, you'd know how wrong you are, but we can't tell you what we know." The problems and pressures of writing history as servants of government are both real and great, as are the difficulties of the military historian in an academic department. One way to emphasize the very considerable amount that we all have in common, rather than accentuate differences that arise from different circumstances, is to promote the most vigorous possible exchange of views. The Army's visiting chairs in military history, together with those of the other services, are a major contribution to this. So would be an effort to get academic military historians and official historians together in periodic symposia. The very successful naval symposium held every two years at Annapolis and its counterpart at Colorado Springs come to mind. The Center of Military History's Vietnam symposium is an example of the exchange of views on a particular issue. Perhaps the Center could arrange similar meetings in a more general and periodic way. The more members of the community of military historians know one another and one another's work, the stronger the discipline of military history will be.

AT THE CENTER

Keegan Talk

Professor John Keegan, Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and author of *The Face of Battle* and *Six Armies in Normandy*, spoke in April before a gathering of Center staff and guests on the British experience in military history education. His talk was the first in The Army Historian Speakers' Series, a program featuring well-known academics from other countries. Dr. Keegan is currently a visiting fellow at Princeton University.

Bell Presentation

In March, William G. Bell, a Center historian and authority on the American West, made a presentation to the Center of twenty-eight limited edition prints from his personal collection. The prints, which have become part of the Army Art Collection, represent the works of Frederick Remington, Charles Shreyvogel, Frank Tenney Johnson, Francis Beaugureau, and other painters of frontier themes. Mr. Bell retired on March 30 after having completed over forty years in government service, almost three decades of which were with the Center.

Johnson Chair

Dr. Graham A. Cosmas of the Center's Southeast Asia Branch has been named Harold Keith Johnson Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Dr. Cosmas, author of *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War* and other works, came to the Center's historical staff from the Marine Corps' History and Museums Division in 1979. His award marks the first time a government historian has been named to the Johnson chair. Dr. Cosmas takes up his new post this July, and will return to the Center in July 1985.

Bryant Lecture

Dr. William Cullen Bryant II presented an illustrated lecture entitled, "West Point, Cradle of the Hudson River School of Painting," to the staff and guests of the Center in February. Dr. Bryant, a descendent of the poet of the same name, is author of a number of works on Bryant's life and work, several of which deal with his influence on American art.

Ten Important Books

Strategic Thought

The Army Historian continues here its series of bibliographical essays on various aspects of military history with an examination of ten classics on strategy.

There are almost as many definitions of strategy as there have been writers on strategy. By the eighteenth century, the original Greek *strategia*, or generalship, had come to be called the science of military movement out of cannon shot. Clausewitz defined strategy as "the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war," and von Moltke the Elder viewed it as "the practical adaptation of the means placed at the general's disposal to the attainment of the object in view." In the past century, the term has been used freely without strict definition, and there has been a tendency to intermingle concepts of policy and strategy and of strategy and tactics. A recent proliferation of books purporting to be strategic in emphasis has added to the confusion. The inclusion of the word "strategy" in a title does not necessarily mean that the work has anything to do with strategy. When writers speak of strategy, they often mean something quite different. Lacking in the literature are clear distinctions between policy, strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics. Readers would be better served were there an agreed conceptual framework of the components of national security affairs they could use to winnow out the chaff from the grain as they read on strategy.

Beginning at the highest level of national security affairs there is *policy*, quite simply the expression of a nation's or a coalition of nations' *goals* in relation to other nations or groups in peace or war. *Strategy* is a *plan* for using the aggregate of a nation's or coalition's power—political, economic, psychological, and military—to achieve, in peace or war, the ends of policy. (This level has often been called "grand strategy.") *Military strategy* is but one component of strategy, that involving armed forces, and constitutes a *plan* to deploy and apply a nation's or coalition's military instrument in the furtherance of policy. Military *operations* are the actual use of the military component, when the military strategy is put into operation, much as diplomacy is the operational aspect of the external political component of strategy. The plan to put an army in the field, in other words, is military strategy; operations involve actually putting the army in the field. Military operations are the link between military strategy and military *tactics*, the body of ideas for actual engagement. (Liddell Hart drew the line between military strategy and tactics at actual fighting, and Mahan placed it at "contact." Other thinkers on the topic have sought to differentiate between the various levels of military strategy, operations, and tactics with such concepts as "grand tactics" and "operational strategy.") Readers without a command of these distinctions between strategy and the other aspects of national security affairs will find themselves sinking in a welter of words as they approach the literature on this subject.

Reading time is a sharply limited commodity, and the reading of a serious book is always a major undertaking. Bernard Brodie recognized this in posing the following question: "Is the reading of this book at this time worth more to me than the reading of any other works that I could read at the same time?" Readers could begin with the collection of essays edited by Edward M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), a book not since surpassed by a work of its type, now being revised. The following works by original thinkers offer a representative sampling of the most important contributions to the literature.

1. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War.* Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
2. Machiavelli, Niccolo. *Art of War.* Rev. ed. of the Ellis Farnsworth trans. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
3. Jomini, Antoine Henri. *The Art of War.* Translated by G.H. Mendell. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1862.
4. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1890.

6. Douhet, Guilio. *The Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. New York: Coward McCann, 1942. (Reprinted by the Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1983.)
7. Liddell Hart, Basil H. *Strategy*. London: Faber & Faber, 1954.
8. Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong). *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966.
9. Beaufre, André. *An Introduction to Strategy*. Translated by R.H. Barry. London: Faber & Faber, 1965.
10. Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

That Sun Tzu wrote his *Art of War* in the fourth century B.C. does not diminish the freshness of his insight into the principles of strategy. Among thinkers of the past perhaps only Clausewitz is comparable, and even that nineteenth-century luminary is more dated than Sun Tzu, although Clausewitz wrote more than two thousand years later. Unlike most of the classical Greek and Roman writers of corresponding Western experience, Sun Tzu did not write with a primary interest in the elaboration of involved strategems or in superficial and transitory techniques. He developed instead a systematic treatise on strategy to guide rulers and generals. For strategy and military strategy, the thirteen short essays in *The Art of War* are far more useful than the writings of a Thucydides or a Caesar.

Moral strength and intellectual faculty, Sun Tzu believed, were decisive in war. If a strategy applied these properly, war could be waged with certainty of success. In implementing his strategy, the victor frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances, created cleavages in his opponent's ranks, nurtured subversion, and brought all resources short of main force to bear to isolate and demoralize him, breaking his will to resist. "To subdue the enemy without fighting," Sun Tzu held, "is the acme of skill." Only when these methods failed to overcome the enemy was there recourse to armed force, with a view toward achieving victory in the shortest possible time and at the least possible cost in lives and effort.

Sun Tzu's teachings were greatly influential in Japanese military thought through World War II, but not as much in Japanese military practice. They ignored his precepts more often than they followed them. Pearl Harbor, although a total strategic suprise, produced only a momentary military advantage and, in crystallizing the will of the American people, was at variance with Sun Tzu's emphasis on the fundamental importance of morale in war. In China, an inflexible Japanese strategy was frustrated by the forces of a man who was profoundly influenced by Sun Tzu: Mao Tse-tung. In the West, although a summary of *The Art of War* had been translated into French in 1772, Sun Tzu was little known. Perhaps exposure to his thought could have corrected the obscurity, to most, of Clausewitz's ideas. Liddell Hart had already formulated his major strategic principles by the time he encountered Sun Tzu's work in 1927 and found that it mirrored his own thoughts on the indirect approach in strategy and tactics. In America, the essays in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, published almost two years after Pearl Harbor, made no mention of Sun Tzu. After the appearance of Griffith's excellent translation from the Chinese in 1963, however, *The Art of War* became part of American staff college reading lists, and has since maintained a place of prominence.

The period during which Sun Tzu wrote was one in which feudal warfare in China, conducted according to a generally accepted code and often with few casualties, was changing into conflicts between conscripted armies employing large numbers of troops and ferocious violence. The fifteenth-century Italy in which Machiavelli wrote was the scene of almost bloodless campaigns between mercenary forces. Machiavelli was contemptuous of the combatants in battles such as that at Zagonara, where "none was killed excepting Lodovico degli Obizzi, and he together with two of his men was thrown from his horse and suffocated in the mud." War was too valuable a method of statecraft so to be wasted.

Machiavelli has been called the first modern military thinker, and his *Arte della Guerra* became a military classic in the West. The focus of its attention is not on military strategy alone, but on the nature of war. His contribution to strategy was in his recognition that war is a branch of politics, and his view that a citizen army furthers a state's policy better than does a mercenary army. He tried to do for military affairs in his *Art of War* what he did for civil affairs in *The Prince* and *Discourses*. Machiavelli used a dialogue between three Florentine aristocrats to present the Roman armies of the Republic and early Empire as possessing the best possible military organization. He was not the first Renaissance thinker to concern himself with military matters, of course, but he was the first to raise the subject to a level from which theoretical analysis of war could progress. Clausewitz would later agree with Machiavelli on the Italian's basic point of departure—the need to subordinate any analysis of strategy to a correct concept of the nature of war.

Antoine Henri Jomini's *Art of War* could have been written by Napoleon had he taken the time. But Napoleon left no treatise setting down his strategic concepts aside from his terse "maxims," and these were actually written by someone else. It was left for Jomini, a Swiss general who served on Napoleon's and Ney's staffs, to distill the doctrines of military strategy from the Emperor's campaigns. Jomini introduced the characteristically modern, systematic study of war in the form it has retained ever since. He also gave the nineteenth century a working definition of military strategy by expanding it beyond its limited eighteenth-century meaning to signify "the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army [to bear] upon the important point of the theater of war, or of a zone of operations." Jomini's writings had an important influence upon American military thought through and beyond the Civil War. It used to be said that Civil War generals went into battle with sword in one hand and copy of Jomini in the other.

Clausewitz, the giant of nineteenth-century strategic thought, had a profound effect upon European military thinking through World War II. While Jomini aimed to explain a rational method for winning battles, Clausewitz delved into the basic nature of war. "It was my ambition," he wrote, "to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who might be interested in the subject." Unfortunately, he succeeded beyond his wildest imaginings. Clausewitz is known of by all, but few *know* Clausewitz. He held that "war is an act of violence to its utmost bounds," and that the aim of warfare is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. But he qualified this by saying that "the political object, as the original motive of the war, should be the standard for determining the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made." In other words, military strategy should only bring force to bear to further the policy it is designed to implement, and policy should not be made subservient to military strategy. Clausewitz's disciples, however, clung to his vivid leading phrases and missed (or disregarded) his qualifying clauses. In pursuing the war after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan to achieve a quick victory in 1914, the Germans discarded Clausewitz's most basic idea that the political end must not be dominated by the military objective. But his writing lent itself to such misinterpretation by expounding his theory in a way too abstract and involved for most concrete-minded soldiers to follow. *On War* is not easy going, but the edition listed, which includes excellent companion essays by Howard, Paret, and Brodie, and a reading guide by Brodie, will usher the serious reader into an intellectual world far beyond the clichés that are all that many know of Clausewitz's work.

Until the advent of the nuclear age, America's significant contributions to warfare were largely in the fields of tactics and technology, rather than strategy. Alfred Thayer Mahan was perhaps the only strategic theorist of international stature produced in nineteenth-century America. Like Jomini, Admiral Mahan believed that strategy must make its chief objective the organized forces of the enemy. Beyond naval theory and history, Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power* helped shape the imperial policies of Germany and Japan, confirmed British policy, and helped set the United States on an imperial course of its own in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

As the command of the sea was fundamental to Mahan's thought, command of the air was fundamental to Douhet's. As an Italian artillery officer in 1909, Douhet began thinking seriously about the impact of aircraft upon warfare. The ideas he first published in 1921 as *Command of the Air* were a reaction to the interminable devastation of a war fought from fixed positions, especially the bloody stalemate on the Austro-Italian front. Much as "tank thinkers" of the 1920s and 1930s sought to pierce defensive lines and bring about a quick decision, Douhet sought to jump over lines to cities, industrial centers, and marshalling areas. The listed English translation, not an especially good one but the only one available, is an expanded version under the title of his original 1921 essay. Land forces were relegated to defensive roles only, and the air arm was seen as the sole offensive arm, one which would shatter civilian morale and break the enemy nation's will to resist. The final edition included an essay on "The War of 19–," in which German air forces defeated France and Belgium within a few days.

The question of Douhet's influence on subsequent strategic thinking has been hotly debated by scholars. Certainly he had an effect upon German prewar thinking and fed British and French fears of massive air attacks against civilian targets. It may be a mistake to hold, as some historians have, that because a full English translation did not appear until 1942, Douhet had little or no influence in the English-speaking world. A translation of his 1921 essay was available at the U.S. Army's Air Service Tactical School as early as 1923, and extracts of his work were circulated there in the early 1930s. Douhet's idea of the absolute necessity for an air arm as a separate and independent force was

one whose time would come. His contribution was in strategy and military strategy, and he need not have always been correct on specifics to have been significant. Indeed, World War II would prove almost all of his specific prescriptions to have been wrong.

Basil H. Liddell Hart was not a general; he rose only to the rank of captain in the British army. But German Generals Guderian and Rommel both called themselves his pupils. Liddell Hart had the frustration of seeing his ideas ignored in his own country, but enthusiastically embraced in other countries, particularly by enemies of Britain. It was a frustration he shared with other British military thinkers and reformers, particularly J.F.C. Fuller. In the interwar years, Liddell Hart was known principally as a leading exponent of the use of tank and air power. Like Douhet's, Liddell Hart's ideas were a reaction to the waste and indecisiveness of static warfare in World War I, in his case the tragedy of the Somme in 1916. The hallmark of his strategic thinking is the "indirect approach," a method he found closely related to all problems of the influence of mind upon mind—the most influential factor in human history. "The indirect approach," wrote Liddell hart, "is as fundamental to the realm of politics as to the realm of sex." The same is true in tactics, military strategy, and strategy, writ large.

Liddell Hart's immense lifetime bibliography is distilled in his *Strategy*, in which he traces the success of the indirect approach (or failure through ignoring the principle) from the Greek wars through World War II. The emphasis is on military strategy, but his chapters on strategic theory and the larger form of strategy clearly outline the links between policy, strategy, military strategy, and tactics. He saw the aim of strategy in the discovery and piercing of the opposing government's Achilles' heel, and of military strategy in the penetration of a chink in the opposing force's armor. To strike with the strongest effect, one must strike at weakness. Liddell Hart's "concentrated essence of strategy" boils down to eight concise maxims, six positive and two negative: 1) Adjust your end to your means; 2) keep your object always in mind; 3) choose the line (or course) of least expectation; 4) exploit the line of least resistance; 5) take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives; 6) ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible and adaptable to circumstances; 7) do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard; 8) do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has failed. One need only look at this century's most spectacular military successes and failures to see the extent to which these basic strategic principles apply.

Mao Tse-tung belongs chronologically at this point. His principal works on problems of war and strategy were written in the late 1930s, after Liddell Hart had produced the main body of his strategic and tactical theories. Mao formulated his strategic ideas in the milieu of the protracted Chinese Civil and Sino-Japanese Wars. His basic advice on military strategy was that when stronger, a force must attack with full strength and bring the war to a quick solution. But when weaker, a force must avoid decisive battle and wear down the enemy's will to win through the employment of all the strategic components, not just military means. It was a strategy used with success by the Americans against the British in 1780–81 and, to American chagrin, by America's foes later. The Chinese text of Mao's works contains word-for-word citations from Sun Tzu, and Mao in fact sums up that master strategist's teachings in the definition he gives to guerrilla tactics: "avoiding strength and striking at weakness." Mao's strategy and tactics are embodied in his four slogans: 1) When the enemy advances, we retreat; 2) when the enemy halts, we harass; 3) when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack; 4) when the enemy retreats, we pursue. Mao's military ideas and those of his interpreters in particular situations, such as General Giap, have had an incalculable effect upon the course of world history. He is the rare example of a strategic thinker whose ideas have been closely and successfully followed.

Among the first to suffer the consequences of Mao's strategic thought assiduously applied were the French. General André Beaufre witnessed at close hand his country's defeat and occupation in 1940 and the loss of French Indochina, and he commanded French forces for the Suez intervention in 1956, a military success but strategic and policy defeat. He wrote his *Introduction* in 1963, shortly after the French abandonment of Algeria. Beaufre saw in every defeat one overriding common factor. In each case, the winner had a strategy and the loser did not. Beaufre saw himself living in a period in which was unfolding one of the greatest upheavals in human history since the fall of Rome; he portrayed world politics as a stark confrontation between a ruthless East, possessing a strategy, and a West without one. For all that, he carries his reader on a fascinating intellectual journey with mathematical progression, sharply drawing the lines between policy, strategy, and operations. He saw strategy as a tune played in two keys: "direct strategy," in which force is the essential factor; and "indirect strategy," in which force recedes in-

to the background and its place is taken by psychology and planning. There is no fuzziness of thought here, although American readers may have difficulty with his Cartesian approach. The language and logic are typically Gallic, even in translation.

The "great defense debate" on strategy in the 1950s involved questions of massive retaliation *versus* flexible response and balanced forces as opposed to dependence upon nuclear deterrent, with attending questions such as whether nuclear war was conceivable and whether nuclear weapons could be used short of all-out war. John L. Gaddis, in his *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), summarizes the evolution of national strategy during this period. The debate was never more than temporarily resolved; it is resurrected whenever defense budgets become tight.

Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* is listed here not because of his positions in the debates and sub-debates, positions which have been in and out of fashion since the publication of the first edition of the book in 1959, but because no one has approached his stature as the preeminent American seminal thinker on strategy in the postwar era. In his landmark study, the most important book on American strategy to appear in its decade, Brodie made the definitive statement for nuclear deterrence. He saw in the frightening potential of nuclear arms a need to start from scratch with completely new strategic ideas, to fashion a logical strategy according to the requirements of the time. For Brodie, effective defense against nuclear attack was practically impossible, and he ruled out preventive and preemptive war. Massive retaliation was justified in case of an attack on NATO countries or the United States, but was foolish in response to local aggression. Brodie saw the only feasible strategy as one of deterrence. Debated by strategic thinkers ever since its publication, Brodie's work remains a point of departure for all subsequent thought on nuclear strategy, and arrived at conclusions to which strategists continue to return.

Specialists will find absent from this list works they regard as indispensable to any collection of strategic classics, and non-specialists may be intimidated by its weight. Readers who begin with a conceptual framework on the distinctions between the components of national security affairs will find the reading of but one of these books alone more valuable than any number of textbooks, lectures or, for that matter, bibliographical essays distilling the thoughts of the masters.

B.D.H.

D Plus 40 Years

This June 6 marks the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, the beginning of the Allied drive across western Europe. Part of the eighty-odd volumes of the Center of Military History's U.S. Army in World War II series, the following six books recount European Theater events of 1944–45 from the Normandy Landings to V-E Day with accuracy and great detail. Period photos illustrate the texts, and maps pinpoint troop movements.

Cross-Channel Attack, by Gordon A. Harrison. (1951 [reprinted 1977], 519 pp.)

This volume covers the prelude to the June 6 assault, the preparations and discussions of strategy on both the Allied and German sides from 1941 to 1944, and describes the combat operations of the First U.S. Army in Normandy from D-Day to July 1, 1944.

Breakout and Pursuit, by Martin Blumenson. (1961, 748 pp.)

The operations of the First U.S. Army from July 1 through September 10, 1944, and of the Third U.S. Army from August 1 through August 31, 1944, are recounted. Covered are the "battle of the hedgerows," the Mortain counterattack, the reduction of Brest, and the liberation of Paris, with the action ending at the Siegfried Line and the Meuse River.

The Lorraine Campaign, by H.M. Cole. (1950, 657 pp.)

The campaign waged in Lorraine from September 1 through December 18, 1944, is detailed, with the focus on the tactical operations of the Third Army and its subordinate units. The Lorraine campaign is treated as a "common campaign" in the

General Eisenhower with paratroopers before their drop behind the Normandy beaches.

military history education of officers, and this work has been put to much use as a reference in Army schools.

The Siegfried Line Campaign, by Charles B. MacDonald. (1963, 670 pp.)

This volume tells the story of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies from the first crossings of the German border on September 11 to the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes on December 16, 1944. The reduction of Aachen and the costly fighting in the Huertgen Forest are described, and a section is devoted to the operations of the First Allied Airborne Army in Operation MARKET/GARDEN in Holland.

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, by H.M. Cole. (1965, 750 pp.)

The German winter counteroffensive from jump-off on December 16, 1944, until Allied armies were ready to eliminate the bulge in their lines in early January 1945 is covered. German plans and Allied reaction are described in detail.

The Last Offensive, by Charles B. MacDonald. (1973, 532 pp.)

The focus of this book is on the role of the American armies—First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and to a lesser extent, Fifteenth—which comprised the largest and most powerful military force the United States has ever put in the field. The role of Allied armies—First Canadian, First French, and Second British—is recounted in sufficient detail to put the role of American armies in perspective, as is the story of tactical air forces in support of the ground troops.

Readers interested in acquiring any of these books should request ordering information from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. For a complete list of Center publications available for purchase, write Administrative Support Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pulaski Building Room 4224, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314.

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